The following article is transcribed from the New York Times, dated September 10,1861:

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To the Editor of New-York Times:

 

          In your issue of the 30th ult., there is an editorial comment on "The destruction at Gosport Navy-yard," in which manifest injustice is done a most estimable and meritorious officer of the Navy. With a knowledge of all the facts and circumstances doubtless your judgment would be otherwise than that "The transaction must remain stamped on the page of American history as the most disgraceful that ever befel our Navy, and one of the most disastrous that ever happened to the Government. The blame of the affair will chiefly rest, perhaps, on Commodore MCCALUEY, whose conduct is wholly inexplicable, but seems to be a compound of imbecility, drunkenness, and treason." In the history of our Navy, there never was an officer environed with so many difficulties as was Commodore MCCAULEY on that occasion -- and even now he cannot, in the peculiar situation in which he is placed, defend himself against the serious charges and allegations you have been pleased to make. The Senate has ordered an investigation of the affair by a Select Committee, pending which, propriety would seem to forbid Commodore MCCAULEY from making a public appeal in his defence. While he is thus debarred that privilege, the allegations contained in the article referred to are circulated far and wide, and the absence of any contradiction or explanation is deemed conclusive of their verity. Congress having closed its session without proceeding with the investigation, there certainly can be no objection to an attempt, on the part of a friend, to rescue the fair fame and name of Commodore MCCAULEY from the obloquy cast upon him. In order to do this, however, it is necessary to refer to the correspondence which forms the basis of the unqualified and sweeping denunciation with which he is assailed. Before proceeding, it may not be amiss to state the fact, which should be constantly recollected, that Commodore MCCAULEY stood "solitary and alone" at the Gosport Navy-yard, without officers and means at command, to defend the public property committed to his charge. The officers attached to Yard and Station were Commanders ROBB, TUCKER, ROOTES, R.L. PAGE and ARTHUR SINCLAIR; Lieutenants SPOTSWOOD, SHARP, G.T. SINCLAIR, POINDEXTER, MURPHY and SEMMES. These officers, with the exception of Lieut. SEMMES, resigned in a body, and placed themselves, forthwith, in hostile position to the Government. They were universally acknowledged in the service, as amongst the first of their respective grades, and no one could or did for a moment suspect their loyalty to the flag and the country. The extraordinary crisis which happened at that time in Virginia, has become a portion of the nation's history, and is familiar to all persons of intelligence. Events passed in such rapid succession, it was impossible for the Department, much less Commodore MCCAULEY, isolated as he was, to provide for the emergencies as they arose. If the Secretary of the Navy, with all the means of the Government at command, could not afford protection to the public property, how was it possible for Commodore MCCAULEY to do it, in the midst of a people just embarking in a sudden and extraordinary revolution, without its parallel in this or any other country? The Secretary of the Navy in his report of July 4, says: "The Navy-yard at Norfolk, protected by no force or garrison, has always been a favored depot with the Government. It was filled with arms and munitions, and several ships were in the harbor dimantled and in ordinary, and in no condition to be moved, had there been men to move them. There were, however, no seamen there or on home stations to man these vessels, or even one of them of the larger, class, and any attempt to withdraw them, or either of them, without a crew, would in the then sensitive and disturbed condition of the public mind have betrayed alarm and distrust, and been likely to cause difficulty. Apprehensive, however, that action might be necessary, the Commandant of the Navy-yard was early in April advised of this feeling, and cautioned to extreme vigilance and circumspection. These admonitions were a few days later repeated to Commodore MCCAULEY. This commandant, whose patriotism and fidelity were not doubted, was surrounded by officers in whom he placed confidence, but most of them, as events soon proved, were faithless to their flag and the country." It is thus apparent that Commodore McCauley had not seamen to man or remove a single ship, and that the Department had not the ability to furnish them. In fact, the Secretary, in his letter of April 16, informs the Commodore, that "Men have been ordered from New-York to man and assist in moving the vessels; but recent demands have left an insufficient number to meet the requisisition. Under these circumstances, should it become necessary, Commodore PENDERGRAST will assist you with men from the Cumberland." Would it have been prudent in Commodore MCCAULEY to have thus crippled the Cumberland by withdrawing from her crew a sufficient number of men to have manned the Merrimac, Germantown, Plymouth and Dolphin, or even one of them? The crew of that ship did not exceed much, if any, 300 men, and she was indispensable for the protection of the Yard and other public property from attack, which was threatened, and might have been made at any moment. These facts are not mentioned for the purpose of calling in question the acts of the Department. Certainly not for censure, as the Department, as well as Commodore MCCAULEY, was surrounded by difficulties at that time, which no human foresight could have avoided. As the Merrimac has been particularly alluded to, let us see whether your conclusions are altogether just, and whether it would have been prudent in Commodore MCCAULEY to have acted otherwise than as he did in relation to that ship? At the time Mr. ISHERWOOD reported to him, April 13, the Merrimac was a dismantled hulk, with a roof over her, and only her lower masts. The "engines were in a wretched state, all the braces were out of the boilers, having been removed with a view to the substitution of other and larger ones, and the entire machinery was in a disabled condition." Such was the situation of the machinery, according to Mr. ISHERWOOD's report. Her armament was not on board, neither was there time nor opportunity to place it in position while the repairs of her engines were progressing; neither was there at any subsequent period. Mr. ISHERWOOD reported, April 17, the machinery ready for steam, and informed Commodore MCCAULEY that forty-four firemen and coal-heavers were ready to go on board, and was exceedingly urgent that the vessel should be dispatched forthwith. Mr. ISHERWOOD doubtless discharged the duty assigned him with his wonted skill and energy, but his duty was a specialty, that of fitting the machinery for temporary use. However, he seems to have been disposed on that occasion to have assumed more responsible and higher duties -- those properly belonging to Commodore MCCAULEY, for the faithful performance of which he, and not Mr. ISHERWOOD, was responsible to the Department. It was true there were forty-four coal-heavers and firemen on board, but where was the crew to man the vessel? Commodore MCCAULEY had no men at his disposal, neither had the Department the ability to furnish them. Could he have justified himself if he had permitted a vessel of the size and value of the Merrimac, with the Germantown in tow, to sail with only a commander and forty-four coal-heavers and firemen on board. If the vessel had been lost, it would have been no justification to have said that he acted on the advice of an engineer. The response would have been, that his want of ordinary prudence and judgment was such as to make it manifest he was unfit for the position he held in the Navy. The Merrimac measured 3,200 tons, nearly double the tonnage of the Cumberland, and without her armament, her draft of water was equal to that of the latter ship fitted for sea. Mr. ISHERWOOD admits there were obstructions in the channel, but it was his judgment the ship could pass without feeling them. While Mr. ISHERWOOD'S skill as an engineer is not questioned, it is asking a little too much that his judgment should be considered infallible about the passage of obstructions in a narrow channel, especially when he did not know the extent of those obstructions. Subsequent events clearly establish the fact that the Merrimac with the Germantown in tow, even if they had had proper crews, could not have passed the obstructions in the channel as easily as Mr. ISHERWOOD imagined. Commodore PAULDING, in his report of April 29, gives a very correct account of the condition of the Yard, and the state of feeling existing, as well as of the difficulties with which Commodore MCCAULEY was surrounded. He further states: "At two different points, where the main channel is narrow, at Craney Island and Sewall's Point, numerous hulks and other obstructions were sunk, those of the light boats having been used for that purpose, and the work was still going on, each day rendering the difficulty of the passage greater; the object being to prevent the men-of-war at the Navy-yard from leasing the port." In coming out with the Cumberland she brought up in crossing the wrecks off Sewall's Point, and hung for some hours, and was finally dragged off by the chartered tugs Yankee and Keystone State. Without the aid of these powerful steamers we should have been greatly embarrassed, and the Cumberland in immediate peril. Now, if the Cumberland encountered such difficulties as these, is it not presumable that the Merrimac, a ship of certainly equal, if not a greater draft of water, with the Germantown in tow, would have experienced similar peril? It must be recollected that the powerful steamtugs Yankee and Keystone State were not at that time at hand to have afforded relief. Again, the Secretary of the Navy, in his letter to Commodore MCCAULEY of April 16, directed him to submit that letter, and his confidential communication of the 10th to Commodore PENDERGRAST, who would cooperate in carrying the views of the Department into effect. In that letter he directed Commodore MCCAULEY to continue to carry out his instructions of the 10th, in which he said: "It is desirable that there should be no steps taken to give needless alarm; but it may be best to order most of the shipping to sea or other stations." Would not the removal of the Merrimac, with the Germantown in tow, even admitting they had succeeded in passing the obstructions in the channel, have caused that very alarm which the Secretary seemed anxious to avoid, and might not the vessels have fallen into the hands of the insurrectionists? It was a fact well known that some of the very officers who had been connected with the Yard, and had resigned so suddenly, were at that time in command of armed steamers and steam-tugs in the harbor, ready to attack and capture these very vessels, if an attempt was made to send them to sea without proper crews and armaments. "What, then, was Commodore MCCAULEY to do? Was he to be allowed no discretion, when the responsibility rested upon him? He had been ordered to send the vessels to sea or other stations, but at the same time informed that the Department had no men at its command to assist in moving the vessels, and his only resort would have been to weaken the crew of the Cumberland, which was the only defence of the yard with all the valuable property therein. He was not aware that the Department had dispatched Commodore PAULDING with reinforcements. Then he was surrounded with perils which were increasing every moment, and if he had delayed, all the public property at that Yard would have fallen into the hands of the enemy, led on by the identical officers who had so recently proved faithless to the flag. As a military necessity, he broke up and destroyed the machinery of the Merrimac and scuttled her, together with all the other ships in ordinary at the Yard, spiked the guns and rendered the other property useless, as far as he had the means at disposal. If Commodore MCCAULEY had permitted the Merrimac, with the Germantown in tow, to have proceeded to sea in their defenceless condition, and they had been captured, as most assuredly they would have been, then he would have been charged with imbecility and treason and it would have been in vain for him to have attempted to excuse himself, by alleging that he had followed the earnest advice of Mr. ISHERWOOD. An attentive perusal of the report of the Secretary in connection with the correspondence from which you have quoted so extensively, will clearly demonstrate, that in the discharge of his duty on that trying occasion, Commodore MCCAULEY displayed a sound judgment and an anxiety to comply with the wishes and views of the Department, and so far from meriting the censure you have bestowed upon him, he deserves the thanks of the country. It may not be inappropriate to conclude with the remark, that throughout the whole of his naval career, Commodore MCCAULEY has been without reproach -- he has enjoyed the confidence of all Administrations, having been employed in many important and varied commands, always performing the duty assigned him with distinguished ability, to the entire satisfaction of the Government, and it is hardly just, at this late day, he should be charged with imbecility and treason, when the facts will not justify such allegations. B. WASHINGTON CITY, Aug. 18, 1861.

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