In late July 1861, after the defeat at Manassas, Gen. McClellan was called to Washington. President Lincoln gave him command of what became the Army of the Potomac. During the coming months, McClellan reorganized and drilled his army. However, after two months of inactivity, the President, Congress, and the northern newspapers were becoming impatient.

          Being pressured and hearing Gen. Johnston may be evacuating Leesburg, Virginia, McClellan ordered Gen. Stone to perform a reconnaissance across the Potomac River. If Johnston was evacuating Leesburg, Stone was ordered to give Johnston a nudge. Stone’s scouts found an empty camp. Col. Devens received orders to detach 20 men to explore a path up the bluff and perform a reconnaissance. Captain Philbrick with his 20 men had gone less than a mile from Leesburg where they found an enemy encampment.

          Col. Baker, Lt. Col. Ward, and Lt. French were ordered to arrive near Harrison’s Island by daybreak on October 21st. That morning, Baker met with Stone who cautioned him about passing artillery across the river. If he did get the cannons across he had to ensure he had it supported by a good infantry. After receiving the advice from Stone, Baker rode to his troops located at Harrison’s Island.

          Baker in crossing the Potomac River was only able to cross 25 troops at a time. Baker acquired a gun from Bunting’s Battery and two mountain howitzers of Lt. French’s 1st Artillery. Baker, as the Brigade Commander, should have stayed on Harrison’s Island to keep the troops organized and the supplies moving to the front. Instead, Baker went up the bluff to command the operation. However, his inexperience in battle did not allow him to distribute his men properly.

          When Col. Cogswell arrived at the top of the bluff, Baker asked him for his assessment of the troop disposition. Cogswell advised Baker “it was very defective.” The hills on the left should be occupied by our forces as they will overlook the entire field. However, Baker did not heed Cogswell’s advice and 20 minutes later the enemy occupied the woods and were firing down on the Baker’s troops.

          Confederate troops, specifically Mississippi sharpshooters, laid down a deadly fire against the guns. The cannoneers were carried away wounded or dead. The cannons were taken down the hill to prevent capture.

          About 4pm, Baker was killed while leading his troops. His death demoralized the troops and the remaining officers decided to retreat. Col. Lee started moving the troops to the rear. However, Cogswell, who was the senior officer, decided to cut a path through the enemy lines towards Edward’s Ferry. In doing so, his troops ran into a wall of Confederate fire. Cogswell ordered his troops to hold still. However, a Confederate officer, posing as a Union officer, rode in front of the troops urging them forward. The regiment charged while their officers were trying to recall them. The Union forces ran in to a wall of fire and were driven back.

          With the heavy Confederate fire, the Union troops were scrambling backwards, often stumbling and tumbling down the cliff. Going down was extremely treacherous and jagged. The retreating troops tumbled on the heads of those below and in some cases falling on friendly bayonets Devens was able to escape by swimming across the river.

          In Cogswell’s Official Report, he points to two principal causes of the defeat. The first was the troops being transported across the river had to be organized by each commander. The second was the disposition of the troops. He felt the troops should have been better placed and the hills occupied. The brunt of the action was on the left, where the hills were located and the right.

          Col. Baker was a senator from Oregon and a very close friend of President Lincoln. With his death and the disaster of the battle, the 37th Congress created the Joint Committee on the Conduct of the War.

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