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The following article are transcribed from Harper's Weekly Journal of Civilization, dated August 10, 1861.

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The Lesson of Defeat

 

          If we are true to ourselves, the disaster of 21st July will prove a benefit rather than an injury. The Great Bethel blunder taught us the folly of going to battle under civilian leadership; the Bull Run tragedy is fraught with many valuable lessons.

          It will teach us, in the first place, and not only us, but those also who have in charge the national interests at this crisis, that this war must be prosecuted on scientific principles, and that popular clamor must not be suffered to override the dictates of experience and the rules of strategy. We have the best evidence to prove that the march to Bull Run, and the fight there, were both undertaken against the judgment of Lieutenant-General Scott, and solely in deference to the popular craving for action which owed its origin and main virulence to the New York Tribune. The wretched result must serve as warning for the future. Hereafter our generals must not be hurried into premature demonstrations. If any portion of the press should attempt hereafter to goad them into acting in opposition to their judgment, public sentiment must rebuke the mischievous endeavor, and our officers and the Government must withstand it resolutely. No doubt, in the course of the next few weeks or months, it will often appear that our armies are sluggish, and their action dilatory. We must remember, when this occurs, that there may be reasons for delay which the public can not discern. We must, in such cases, remind each other of the fatal twenty-first of July, and thank God that we can trust implicitly in Abraham Lincoln and Winfield Scott.

          Again. The detailed accounts of the retreat from Bull Run prove hat a very large proportion of our militia officers failed in their duty on that occasion. Some displayed cowardice, other incapacity. This is no matter of surprise. In selecting company and even field officers, our militiamen often attach more weight to wealth and political or social influence than to bravery or soldierly aptitude. Very many commissions are won by intrigue. Under these circumstances it was natural that, in the hour of danger, the officers who owed their epaulets to wealth, political or social influence, or intrigue, should have failed to develop the coolness, courage, and command over their men which soldiers require in their leaders. It was to be expected that they would rather lead than check a panic. This radical flaw in our military system must now be corrected. Great Bethel emancipated us, cheaply enough, for the mischief of civilian brigadiers. Bull run must rid us of cowardly or imbecile colonels, majors, and captains. It announced that hereafter the War Department will exercise the right of reviewing the elections of field officers in each regiment. We trust that no scruple of delicacy or timidity will interfere with the vigorous execution of this rule. It should be extended to captains of companies also. Better offend a thousand ambitions candidates for military rank than have another flight led by colonels, majors, and captains. And there will be great need of the pruning-knife. By means best known to themselves most unfit men are even no obtaining commissions in regiments fitted out here. Intrigue, money, family connections, and all kinds of improper influences are officering our new regiments. By the memory of Bull Run we adjure the War Department and the commanding general to subject all these officers to a thorough test, and to reject the unsuitable without hesitation. We have plenty of bravery and plenty of military talent in the country; for Heaven's sake let some one see that it is used in the right place.

          Let no man be disheartened by the Bull Run disaster. We were beaten, it is true. But we were beaten by an enemy twice as strong as we were. They fought in intrenchments elaborately constructed-we groped our way up to the muzzles of their guns, in total ignorance of the topography of the battlefield. Wherever our soldiers met theirs in fair fight, we beat them. They had been drilling and preparing for the fight for half a year at least; our men were raw levies. And if the battle has proved that with these disadvantages we could not contend against them, it has also proved that our troops possess more personal bravery than theirs, and that our people-whom the defeat has only roused to fresh exertions-have the right stuff in them.

          "With our light, success is a duty!" Let this be our watch-word. We have every thing in our favor' more than twice the population, complete command of the sea, all the industrial capacity of the country, unrestricted communication with the foreign world, all the money we need, and , best of all, a just cause.

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